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Abstract:
Governments in many countries of the world struggle with how to accommodate properly the
needs and claims [rights] of native/indigenous peoples within their jurisdictions whose
presence long predates European conquest and occupation. In this paper, a comparison and
contrast of the approaches of the African and other jurisdictions whose jurisprudence is
informative to the protection of the rights of African indigenous peoples, like the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights compared with the US, Canada, New Zealand and Australia
‘the big four’ who voted against the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous on September
13, 2007 at the UN General Assembly is critically analyzed. The four states that voted against
the Declaration ‘vowed’ to protect the rights of indigenous peoples within their jurisdiction
using their different domestic human rights mechanisms which they argued were adequate to
protect such rights of indigenous peoples. The analysis in this paper resolves around the
practical implications of implementing the Declaration and why the four states voted against it
with the other 11 states abstaining from the vote. The paper questions the extent to which the
Declaration can be held to be ‘binding’ on those states which voted against it, in light of the fact
that the Declaration can be said to contain elements of customary international law which is
binding to all civilized nations irrespective of whether they voted for the Declaration or not.

Paper Description:

I.

Comparative and International Legal Perspectives on Indigenous Peoples: Critical
reflections on the Practicability of Enforcing the UN Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples

On September 13, 2007, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the United Nations
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples [inhereafter the Declaration] by a majority vote
1

of 144 states in favor, 4 against (Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States) and 11
abstentions (Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Burundi, Colombia, Georgia, Kenya, Nigeria,
Russia Federation, Samoa and Ukraine). The states which voted against the Declaration stated
in clear terms that they would not be bound by the Declaration, and that it is impossible for
them to implement. All this took place the fact that some of these countries have constitutional
and Supreme Court rulings that have allowed for aboriginal rights of their indigenous peoples
notwithstanding. For example, Canada through its Constitution and Supreme Court, have
created significant legal protection and recognition for native/indigenous peoples,1 Australia
too has had such domestic obligations albeit in a different form.2
This raises two core questions viz: to what extent, if at all, does the UN Declaration on the
Rights of Indigenous Peoples reflect customary international law or general principles of
international law?3 Have the states that voted against the Declaration exempted themselves,
through the persistent objector doctrine, from any customary norms that may arise from or be
reflected in the Declaration?
In fact, Canada’s reasoning in reaction to her vote against the Declaration is worth quoting in
extenso:
By voting against the adoption of the text, Canada puts on record its disappointment
with both the text’s substance and the process leading to it. For clarity, we also
underline our understanding that this Declaration is not a legally binding instrument. It
has no legal effect in Canada, and its provisions do not represent customary
international law.4
All the above questions remain hotly contested and still unresolved even among the experts of
international human rights law. This paper, will attempt to offer some answers or at least shed
a light on some of these issues which appear to be grey areas.

1

See Sections 25 and 35 of the Canadian Charter of Rights & Freedoms (1982) and the case of Delgamuukw v.
British Columbia 3 S.C.R. 1010 (1967). Indiegnous title is now correctly regarded as sui generis.
2
See the case of Mabo v. Queensland 107 ACR 1, 1992 WL 1290806 (1992) which was the first case in Australia to
recognize Aboriginal title but the Court’s decision was later overturned when the Queensland Legislature passed
legislation overturning the decision. For an excellent discussion of comparative law in several common law
jurisdictions, including Canada, see David H. Getches, Charles F. Wilkinson & Robert A. Williams, Jr., Federal Indian
th
Law 947-1001 (5 ed. 2004) and the much recent case of Maya Villages of Santa Cruz and Conejo v. Attorney
General, Claims nos. 172 & 172 of 2007, Belize S. Ct. Judgment of Oct. 18, 2007.
3
Recall the vote in the UN General Assembly on the Declaration: 144 in favor, 4 against, and 11 abstaining.
Customary international law evolves from the practice of States in matters of international concern and “general
principles” are those commonly accepted by States and reflected in their international relations or domestic legal
th
systems – See Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (6 Ed.) at 15-19.
4
Anaya, Draft, op.cit., at 90.
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In addition to reliance on domestic law, or where domestic law is unavailing, advocates for
indigenous human rights have sought relief through litigation invoking international human
rights norms [such as customary international law] and now the UN Declaration in
international courts.5 Though states are encouraged to establish mechanisms at the national
level for the full recognition and protection of the lands, territories and resources indigenous
peoples possess by reason of traditional ownership, occupation, or use, as well those which
they have otherwise acquired.6 Even when the provisions in the domestic jurisdiction appear
adequate to protect indigenous peoples rights – like can be said to be the case in the United
States and Canada – international human rights norms concerning indigenous peoples is still
relevant to the United States courts and law. The views of Professor Phillip P. Frickey are
important:
[I]n federal Indian law cases the courts are compelled to consider international law. The
reason is simple: the backdrop of international law provides the only satisfactory basis
for sorting out the existence of an inherent federal power over Indian affairs.
Accordingly, the backdrop of international law should likewise be relevant in considering
limitations upon that power …. Under this approach, international norms about the
treatment of indigenous persons would not be directly enforceable in American courts,
but instead would provide a relevant and worthwhile backdrop against which to
consider constitutional and quasi-constitutional claims.7
It is thus clear, that the domestic courts do not only compliment and enforce the international
human rights norms concerning indigenous peoples but also offer the most ideal setting for the
5

In The Case of the Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Case No. 11,577,
2001 WL 34034813 (Aug. 31, 2001), a complaint was filed by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
against Nicaragua alleging that Nicaragua had violated several provisions of the American Convention on Human
Rights by its failure to protect adequately the lands of the Awas Tingni. After considering various international
provisions relating to the protection of indigenous rights, as well as Articles of the Nicaraguan Constitution, the
Court concluded as follows: Para 167 … the Court considers that due to the situation in which the members of the
Awas Tingni Community find themselves due to lack of delimitation, demarcation, and titling of their communal
property, the immaterial damage caused must be repaired, by way of substitution, through a monetary
compensation. See Final Written Arguments of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights in the Case of the
Awas Tingni Mayagna (Sumo) Indigenous Community Against the Republic of Nicaragua, August 10, 2001,
published in 19 Ariz. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 325 (2002), at para. 6.4. See Juan F. Perea, et al, Race and Races: Cases and
nd
Resources for a Diverse America (West, 2007, 2 ed.) pp. 246-284, at 283. For an excellent overview of the InterAmerican human rights framework, see S. James Anaya & Robert A. Williams, Jr., The Protection of Indigenous
Peoples’ Rights Over Lands and Natural Resources Under the Inter-American Human Rights System, 14 Harv. Rts. J.
33 (2001). See also Robert A. Williams, Jr., Encounters on the Frontiers of International Human Rights Law:
Redefining the Terms of Indigenous Peoples’ Survival in the World, 1990 Duke L.J. 660.
6
James Anaya, International Human Rights and Indigenous Law (Draft), at 72. For an excellent discussion of the
Declaration and scholarly debates leading to its adoption, see S. James Anaya & Siegfried Wiessner, The UN
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: Towards Re-empowerment, at Jurist,
http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/.Opinion, Oct. 3, 2007.
7
Philip P. Frickey, Domesticating Federal Indian Law, 81 Minn. L. Rev. 31, 79 (1996).
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protection of indigenous peoples rights. However, international human rights courts like the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights are relevant in considering limitations of domestic
power over indigenous peoples rights.
The provisions in the Declaration relating to lands and resources were the most controversial at
the UN General Assembly debates preceding the adoption of the Declaration. Art. 26 of the
Declaration appears to recognize the indigenous rights to lands without regard to other legal
rights existing in land, either indigenous or non-indigenous.8 The view held by the states that
voted against the Declaration is that Art. 26 ignores the contemporary realities in most
countries by announcing a standard achievement that would be impossible to implement.
These states think that the Declaration is over board and arbitrary with no recognition being
given to the fact that ownership of land may lawfully vest in others – for example, through
grants of freehold or leasehold interests in land.
The views expressed by New Zealand in voting against the Declaration does border on the view
that the Declaration makes indigenous peoples ‘citizens plus’ with special rights which the rest
of the population does not have. I quote New Zealand in part hereunder:
The provision on lands and resources simply cannot be implemented in New Zealand.
Art. 26 states that indigenous peoples have a right to own, use, develop or control lands
and territories that they have traditionally owned, occupied or used. For New Zealand,
the entire country is potentially caught within the scope of this article … Furthermore,
the article implies that indigenous peoples have rights that others do not have.9
New Zealand too expressed reservations about art. 28 of the Declaration. Here below are her
views on the article.
In addition, the provisions on redress and compensation, in particular in article 28, are
unworkable in New Zealand … Again, the entire country would appear to fall within the
scope of the article … It is impossible for the State in New Zealand to uphold a right to
redress and provide compensation for value for the entire country.10
Whereas the fears expressed by the ‘big four’ may be valid, Art. 26 on the lands and resources
provisions of the Declaration must not only be read in line with the state’s existing domestic
laws, but also Art. 46 (2) of the Declaration. For clarity, Art. 46 (2) is reproduced hereunder:

8

It is also important to note that the 4 states that voted against the Declaration are those that have historically
used and followed the doctrine of discovery and the much discredited terra nullius rule.
9
Anaya, Draft, at 91.
10
Id.
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In the exercise of the rights enunciated in the present Declaration, human rights and
fundamental freedoms of all shall be respected. The exercise of the rights set forth in
this Declaration shall be subject only to such limitations as are determined by law, and
in accordance with international human rights obligations. Any such limitations shall be
non-discriminatory and strictly necessary solely for the purpose of securing due
recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and for meeting the just
and most compelling requirements of a democratic society.
The proper reading of Art. 46 of the Declaration may be used to allay the fears expressed by the
states that voted against the Declaration.
Of all the states, that expressed their views about the Declaration either in support or against
the Declaration, the delegation from Benin made the most impressive speech in relation to the
future of the Declaration. The Benin delegation stated thus:
My delegation therefore welcomes the compromise achieved and it is with true
pleasure that Benin opts to vote in favor of the text before us, despite the flaws that
have been stressed by some delegations, in the hope that the opportunity will arise for
the declaration to be improved. It is most important to note that the text has numerous
imperfections, but that it remains desirable for it to be implemented on an interim basis
while improvements are introduced so that it can be endorsed by all delegations.11
Indigenous peoples must have the right to influence the use of land and natural resources that
are important for their survival but the issue of land rights has different connotations in
different States owing to historic and demographic reasons.12

II.

Why Canada, the United States, Australia, New Zealand and Nobody Else Voted
Against the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples13

It is important to observe that only 4 States voted against the UN Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples: viz, Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States. Whereas
several factors could have induced the ‘big four’ to vote against the UN Declaration, their
decisions turns out to be very unfortunate because these four States are home to almost half of
the world’s indigenous peoples. Thus, their voting against the UN Declaration has practical
11

Id., at 94.
See Siegfried Wiessner, Rights and Status of Indigenous Peoples: A Global Comparative and International Legal
Analysis, 12 Harvard Human Rights Journal 57 (1999); and S. James Anaya, Indigenous Peoples in International Law
(2d ed., 2004).
13
Robert A. Williams, Jr., American Indians, class presentation to the class of Critical Race Theory and Practice, on
March 3, 2009, at the University of Arizona, Rogers College of Law, Tucson, USA (2009).
12
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implications in terms of the enjoyment of the indigenous rights as espoused in the Declaration.
All these States share one thing in common; they have a history of using the now discredited
doctrines of discovery and terra nullius to grab indigenous people’s lands. As Chief Justice John
Marshall observed in the case of Johnson v. McIntosh (1823), the exclusion of all other
Europeans, necessarily gave to the nation making the discovery the sole right of acquiring the
soil from the natives, and establishing settlements upon it. Chief Justice Marshall argues further
that in the establishment of these relations, the rights of the original inhabitants were, in no
instance, entirely disregarded; but were necessarily, to a considerable extent, impaired. They
were admitted to be the rightful occupants of the soil, with a legal as well as just claim to retain
possession of it, and to use it according to their own discretion; but their rights to complete
sovereignty, as independent nations, were necessarily diminished, and their power to dispose
of the soil at their own will, to whomsoever they pleased, was denied by the original
fundamental principle, that discovery gave exclusive title to those who made it. The argument
given by Chief Justice Marshall in the McIntosh case, clearly sums up the main reason why the
‘big four’ could have voted against the UN Declaration: the Declaration seeks to empower the
indigenous peoples and actually give them back that which they have been denied and
deprived for generations under legal doctrines such as that of discovery and terra nullius, but
then, the conqueror will not let go, thus the resistance to the UN Declaration.
In Canada, a similar story exists. Robert A. Williams, Jr., quoting Joseph Trutch, the
Commissioner of Land Works for the colonial government in British Columbia, 1867, captures
the entire picture:
The Indians really have no right to the lands they claim, nor are they of any actual value
or utility to them; I cannot see why they should either retain these lands to the
prejudice of the general interests of the Colony, or be allowed to make a market of
them either to Government or to individuals.14
From the above, it is apparent that the colonial master in Canada never intended that the
Indian would own land in the colony as such land was to be vested in the colonizer at the time
of colonization together with his emigrant population.
Similarly, the Indian was never considered independent of the land, the way the land was
passed over to the colonial master, and so did the Indian. The Indian was a mere chattel to be
disposed of just like a car in a warehouse after the purchaser has paid the sale price. This view
is affirmed in the case of R. v. Syliboy thus:
…But the Indians were never regarded as an independent power. A civilized nation first
discovering a country of uncivilized people or savages held such country as its own until
14

Robert A. Williams, Jr., (2009), Id.

6

such time as by treaty it was transferred to some other civilized nation. The savages’
rights of sovereignty, even of ownership, were not recognized. Nova Scotia had passed
to Great Britain not by gift or purchase or even by conquest of the Indians but by treaty
with France, which had acquired it by priority of discovery and ancient possession, and
the Indians passed with it …15
Some of these countries such as Canada have a constitutional provision on indigenous peoples.
However, problems still remain with the practical enforcement and implementation of such
constitutional and other legal provisions in the domestic jurisdictions of these states. The
constitutional provision on aboriginal rights notwithstanding, Canada’s position in relation to
the UN Declaration was a vote against:
… Canada’s position has remained consistent and principled. We have stated publicly
that we have significant concerns with respect to the wording of the current text,
including the provisions on lands, territories and resources; free, prior and informed
consent when used as a veto; self government without recognition of the importance of
negotiations; intellectual property; military issues; and the need to achieve an
appropriate balance between rights and obligations of indigenous peoples, member
States and third parties.16
In a nutshell, Canada objects to each and everything the UN Declaration stands for. The
statement by Ambassador McNee of Canada before the General Assembly is the hallmark of the
disagreements between the four States that voted against the Declaration and the question of
what rights, if any, the indigenous peoples living within the territories of those four states can
and should in fact claim. Although the Declaration has raised a lot of controversy since its
drafting stages, with some states arguing that it makes the indigenous peoples ‘citizens plus’
enjoying special rights which other members of their populations do not enjoy, the true
position and legal standing of the UN Declaration is best summarized by S. James Anaya:
… the Declaration does not attempt to bestow indigenous peoples with a set of special
or new human rights, but rather provides a contextualized elaboration of general
human rights principles and rights as they relate to the specific historical, cultural and
social circumstances of indigenous peoples. The standards affirmed in the Declaration
share an essentially remedial character, seeking to redress the systemic obstacles and
discrimination that indigenous peoples have faced in their enjoyment of basic human

15

1. D.L.R. 307 (Canada) (1929). For an excellent discussion on the use of treaties in between the Indians and their
colonizers, see Robert A. Williams, Jr., Linking Arms Together (Routledge, 1999).
16
See Statement by Ambassador McNee to the General Assembly on the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples, September 13, 2007.
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rights. From this perspective, the standards of the Declaration connect to existing State
obligations under other human rights instruments.17
The argument by Anaya is also fortified in Article 2 of the UN Declaration which states that
indigenous peoples and individuals are free and equal to all other peoples and individuals and
have the right to be free from any kind of discrimination, in the exercise of their rights, in
particular that based on their indigenous origin or identity. In general, the UN Declaration
recognizes the right of indigenous peoples not to be subjected to genocide or ethnocide, or
actions aimed at or affecting their integrity as distinct peoples, their cultural values and
identities, including the dispossession of land, forced relocation, assimilation or integration, the
imposition of foreign lifestyles and propaganda.18
The Canadian government’s reference to principled negotiation with its aboriginal peoples is
mere hot air. All is not well with the purported negotiations between the Canadian government
and its aboriginal peoples. This rather bizarre scenario is remarked upon by Rodolfo
Stavenhagen:
In the Canadian province of British Columbia, the Government refused to recognize
aboriginal land titles. The courts ruled, however, that the Aboriginal titles had not been
extinguished. After years of negotiation, a law on the subject, the Treaty Commissions
Act, was adopted.19
The much touted negotiations by the Canadian government and its aboriginal population have
yielded more discomfort than comfort within the aboriginal circles especially in the Province of
British Columbia where a sizeable number of aborigines live. One of the indigenous groups
involved complains that British Columbia is not negotiating in good faith when it places various
obstacles in the way of this community’s exercise of its rights and recognizes a mere 8 per cent
of the claimed traditional territory. The community complains that the negotiations are useless
when it comes to compensation for prior violations committed against it.20 At the height of this
dispute is the petition to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights submitted by the
Hul’qumi’num Treaty Group against Canada submitted on May 10, 2007.21
In New Zealand, the Treaty of Waitangi/Te Tiriti o Waitangi has been described by Lord Cooke
of Throndon as “simply the most important document in New Zealand’s history…On the one
17

See para. 86 of the Report of the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of the human rights and fundamental
freedoms of indigenous peoples (2008).
18
S. James Anaya, Why There Should not have to be a Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Keynote
Address to the 52d Congress of Americanists, Seville, July 2006.
19
See para. 38 of the Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights and fundamental freedoms
of indigenous people (2006).
20
Id.
21
This petition is still ongoing at the Commission.
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hand, it is viewed as the tool used by the British to establish sovereignty in this country…On the
other hand, the Treaty is seen as a guarantee to Maori fundamental rights, which over the
years, have been severely compromised...”22 It is an established common law doctrine that
“discovery” may confer proprietary rights, provided actual occupation takes place.23
In Australia, the dominant paradigm was the doctrine of terra nullius. The legal regime relating
to aboriginal rights in Australia is based on mainly legislation since there were no treaties like
was the case in New Zealand, Canada and the United States. There are no constitutional
provisions spelling out aboriginal rights in Australia. This puts Australia in a very unique position
when it comes to aboriginal rights. Australia was considered to be terra nullius, an empty land,
uninhabited or occupied by people without settled laws or customs. The Aboriginal peoples’
legal systems were not seen as organized and so were no recognized. The settlers recognized
that Aboriginal people were present in Australia24, but
Resistance, massacres and genocide were also ignored in the application of the doctrine
of terra nullius, which justified the acquisition of land. Aboriginal resistance was far from
insignificant, as many documented examples show…In 1828 the Governor of Tasmania
(Arthur) proclaimed martial law, which was tantamount to a declaration of war against
Aborigines. During the three years in which martial law remained in force, the military
were entitled to shoot on sight any Aboriginal person in the settled districts. 25
Thus through military force, the conqueror was able to assert himself over the subdued
colonized peoples and by that he established his sovereign rule over the conquered peoples.
This was a departure from the long established notion that the aggressor, who puts himself into
the state of war with another, and unjustly invades another man’s right, can, by such an unjust
war, never come to have a right over the conquered.26 As Locke observes:
Though Governments can originally have no other rise than that before mentioned, nor
polities be founded on anything but the consent of the people; yet such has been the
Disorders Ambition has fill’d the World with, that in the noise of War, which makes so
great a part of History of Mankind this consent is little taken notice of: And therefore
22

rd

Marog McDowell & Duncan Webb, The New Zealand Legal System: Structures, processes and legal theory (3
Ed.) at pp. 193-197. For a detailed discussion on the theories used by the settlers to try to legitimize the taking of
traditional lands from the Maori inhabitants, see Alan Ward, An Unsettled History: Treaty Claims in New Zealand at
pp. 125, 147, 148, 149, 156; Carol M. Rose, Property and Persuasion: Essays on the History, Theory, and Rhetoric of
Ownership (Westview Press).
23
Id. For an excellent discussion on New Zealand’s constitutional and treaty-making processes, see Mark W. Gobbi,
Enhancing Public Participation in the Treaty-Making Process: An Assessment of New Zealand’s Constitutional
Response, 6 Tul. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 57 (1998).
24
Barbara Harrison, Collaborative Programs in Indigenous Communities: From Fieldwork to Practice at pp. 18-20.
25
Id.
26
John Locke, The Treaties of Government (1689).
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many have mistaken force of Arms, for the consent of the People; and reckon Conquest
as one of the Originals of Government. But Conquest is far from setting up any
Government, as demolishing an House is from building a new one in its place. Indeed it
often makes way for a new Frame of a Commonwealth, by destroying the former; but,
without the Consent of the People, can never erect a new one.27
The fact that the predecessors of the current governments in Canada, United States, Australia
and New Zealand established their rule over the original inhabitants of those territories through
military force up to now blinds these governments to the fact that the original inhabitants of
the lands that comprise their present day borders are a people worthy consulting on key issues
as clearly lied down in the UN Declaration and that such a processes is not only reasonable to
erase the historical errors and wrongs committed against these indigenous peoples but is
actually the modern and legitimate way of governance. The time to look at the native as a
savage has ended; the native is now part and parcel of the State and must be ruled with dignity.
In Australia, the High Court in the Mabo case is the judiciary’s key input to the terra nullius
debate in Australia. The case drew attention to issues surrounding native title and the original
doctrine of terra nullius. In May 1982, Eddie Mabo and others from the Murray Islands in the
Torres Strait sought legal recognition of common law title to land. The case was in court for ten
years before the Australian High Court gave its decision in June 1992.28 Brennan J. observed
thus:
If the international law notion that inhabited land may be classified as terra nullius no
longer commands general support, the doctrines of the common law which depend on
the notion that native peoples may be “so low in the scale of social organization” that it
is “idle to impute to such people some shadow of the rights know to our law”…can
hardly be retained. If it were permissible in past centuries to keep the common law in
step with international law, it is imperative in today’s world that the common law
should neither be nor see to frozen in an age of racial discrimination. 29
The much discredited doctrine of terra nullius has lost its taste in the modern world. In fact,
although Australia voted against the UN Declaration in September 2007, the regime change in
that country has created a change in heart which is currently pro-the Declaration.
According to Rodolfo Stavenhagen, despite those advances, there is still an “implementation
gap” between legislation and day-to-day reality; enforcement and observance of the law are
27

Id.
Id.
29
Id. It is important to note that the Mabo case decision was later overturned by legislation from the Australian
National Parliament.
28
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beset by myriad obstacles and problems.30 As Eide observes, international standards are often
ignored by public officials within the State parties. Laws aimed at protecting indigenous
peoples’ rights or human rights in general are sometimes in conflict with other laws such as
those relating to mining or natural resource management.31 A number of obstacles have been
encountered in the public administration. There is often bureaucratic inertia and an inability to
adapt to the new emphasis on the protection of indigenous peoples after centuries of
discrimination and neglect.32
Given the doctrinal and practical limitations of domestic legal systems, indigenous peoples
worldwide increasingly look to the processes of international human rights law as tools in their
efforts to survive as distinct communities with historically-based cultures, political institutions,
and entitlements to traditional or ancestral lands. Indigenous peoples’ demands have
generated a great deal of activity within global and regional human rights institutions, placing
the concerns of these peoples at the forefront of international human rights law.
Two of the States that voted against the UN Declaration reiterated their willingness to protect
and promote the rights of indigenous peoples within their domestic jurisdictions. As much as
this may appear as a contradiction in light of the fact that most indigenous peoples have in the
recent past resorted to taking their human rights to the international human rights fora as
opposed to the domestic legal remedies. Canada stated thus:
…we reiterate that Canada will continue to take effective action, at home and abroad, to
promote and protect the rights of indigenous peoples based on our existing human
rights obligations and commitments. Such effective action we must be clear, would not
be undertaken on the basis of the provisions of this *UN+ Declaration…Canada will vote
against adoption of this text.33
Similar sentiments were expressed by the United States in voting against the Declaration. The
use of rhetoric is not only similar but of almost the same degree and effect. The United States
noted:
Although we are voting against this flawed document, my Government will continue its
vigorous efforts to promote indigenous rights domestically. Under United States
domestic law, the United States Government recognizes Indian tribes as political entities

30

See para. 5 of the Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights and fundamental freedoms
of indigenous peoples (2006).
31
Asbjorn Eide, Rights of Indigenous Peoples – Achievements in International Law During the Last Quarter of a
Century, 37 Netherlands Yearbook of International Law (2006), pp. 109-164, at p. 137-138.
32
Id.
33
Ambassador McNee, op.cit.
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with inherent powers of self-determination as first peoples. In our legal system, the
Federal Government has a government-to-government relationship with Indian tribes.34
Although the United States declined to vote in favor of the Declaration, it pledged to continue
its work of promoting indigenous rights internationally and to report of the situation of
indigenous persons in communities throughout the world through the United States
Department of State and to continue her diplomatic efforts in opposition of racial
discrimination against all indigenous individuals and communities.35 Russian delegate used the
same rhetoric in abstaining from the vote on the Declaration. Russian delegate stated:
…we cannot support the draft United Nations declaration on the right of indigenous
peoples and shall abstain in the voting on the draft resolution A/61/L.67. However, we
intend, as in the past, to make promotion and protection of the rights of indigenous
peoples.36
Whereas the above states ‘undertake’ to protect and promote indigenous peoples rights within
their respective domestic jurisdiction, how they will do this let alone their willingness and
ability to do so remains unclear. What is clear though is that all the States that voted against
the Declaration and those which abstained are among some of the countries notorious for
denying indigenous peoples rights and hiding behind the domestic veil to escape from
international scrutiny and accountability in relation to alleged violation of indigenous peoples’
rights.37 Despite the assurances of protection and promotion of indigenous peoples’ rights
within the domestic sphere, the lack of sufficient recourse at the domestic level is one of the
reasons responsible for the upsurge of indigenous peoples concerns at the international level.
Contemporary international law has been very helpful in protecting and promoting indigenous
peoples’ human rights. The Inter-American Human Rights System (OAS) has been very active
handling several claims from indigenous peoples alleging human rights violations.
In the case of Maya Indigenous Communities,38 Belize was found to have violated Article 23 of
the American Declaration by failing to take effective measures to recognize the communal
property rights of the lands traditionally occupied and used by the Maya, and by granting
concessions to third parties to utilize the traditional property and resources of the Maya people
without obtaining “effective consultations.” The Commission then went on to recognize the
independent nature of indigenous peoples’ property right. The Commission noted:
34

Ambassador Hagen of the United States of America in his Address to the General Assembly.
Id.
36
Ambassador Rogachev, Russian Federation delegate to the UN General Assembly addressing the Gen. Assembly
on the UN Declaration.
37
th
See Richard Lillich et al., International Human Rights: Problems of Law, Policy and Practice 1005 (4 ed. 2006).
38
The Case of the Maya Indigenous Communities of the Toledo District v. Belize, Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights, Report Issued 2004.
35
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Accordingly, the organs of the Inter-American human rights system have recognized that
the property rights protected by the system are not limited to those property interests
that are already recognized by states or that are defined by domestic law, but rather
that the right to property has an autonomous meaning in international human rights
law. In this sense, the jurisprudence of the system has acknowledged that the property
rights f indigenous peoples are not defined exclusively by entitlements within a state’s
formal legal regime, but also include that indigenous communal property that arises
from and is grounded in indigenous custom and tradition…39
There have also been instances when judges have used international human rights norms to
enforce indigenous peoples rights in the domestic sphere. A case in point is Maya Villages of
Santa Cruz and Conejo v. Attorney General,40 in which Chief Justice Abdulai Conteh relied on the
international law obligations of the defendants regarding the claimants in upholding the land
rights of the petitioners against the Belizean government.41

III.

Conclusion

Thus, despite the controversies surrounding the adoption of the UN Declaration in the General
Assembly and prior debates to this vote, the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples represents an authoritative common understanding, at the global level, of the
minimum content of the rights of indigenous peoples, upon a foundation of various sources of
international human rights law. The product of a protracted drafting process involving the
demands voiced by indigenous peoples themselves, the Declaration reflects and builds upon
human rights norms of general applicability, as interpreted and applied by the United Nations
and regional treaty bodies, as well as on the standards advanced by ILO Convention No. 169
and other relevant instruments and processes.42 To that extent, the Declaration can be said to
contain norms of customary international law and therefore binding to all members of the UN
General Assembly regardless of whether they voted for, against and or abstained from the vote
on the Declaration in September 2007.

39

Id.
Claims Nos. 172 & 172 of 2008, Belize S. Crt. Judgment of Oct. 18, 2007.
41
See paras. 118-136 of the Judgment.
42
Para. 85 of the Report of the UN Special Rapporteur (2008).
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